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Abstract—Labeled data sets are necessary to train and evaluate
anomaly-based network intrusion detection systems. This work
provides a focused literature survey of data sets for network-
based intrusion detection and describes the underlying packet-
and flow-based network data in detail. The paper identifies 15
different properties to assess the suitability of individual data sets
for specific evaluation scenarios. These properties cover a wide
range of criteria and are grouped into five categories such as
data volume or recording environment for offering a structured
search. Based on these properties, a comprehensive overview of
existing data sets is given. This overview also highlights the
peculiarities of each data set. Furthermore, this work briefly
touches upon other sources for network-based data such as
traffic generators and data repositories. Finally, we discuss our
observations and provide some recommendations for the use and
the creation of network-based data sets.
Index Terms—Intrusion Detection, IDS, NIDS, Data Sets,
Evaluation, Data Mining
I. INTRODUCTION
IT security is an important issue and much effort has been
spent in the research of intrusion and insider threat detec-
tion. Many contributions have been published for processing
security-related data [1]–[4], detecting botnets [5]–[8], port
scans [9]–[12], brute force attacks [13]–[16] and so on. All
these works have in common that they require representative
network-based data sets. Furthermore, benchmark data sets
are a good basis to evaluate and compare the quality of
different network intrusion detection systems (NIDS). Given
a labeled data set in which each data point is assigned to the
class normal or attack, the number of detected attacks or the
number of false alarms may be used as evaluation criteria.
Unfortunately, there are not too many representative data sets
around. According to Sommer and Paxson [17] (2010), the
lack of representative publicly available data sets constitutes
one of the biggest challenges for anomaly-based intrusion
detection. Similar statements are made by Malowidzki et
al. [18] (2015) and Haider et al. [19] (2017). However, the
community is working on this problem as several intrusion
detection data sets have been published over the last years. In
particular, the Australian Centre for Cyber Security published
the UNSW-NB15 [20] data set, the University of Coburg
published the CIDDS-001 [21] data set, or the University of
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New Brunswick published the CICIDS 2017 [22] data set.
More data sets can be expected in the future. However, there
is no overall index of existing data sets and it is hard to keep
track of the latest developments.
This work provides a literature survey of existing network-
based intrusion detection data sets. At first, the underlying data
are investigated in more detail. Network-based data appear in
packet-based or flow-based format. While flow-based data con-
tain only meta information about network connections, packet-
based data also contain payload. Then, this paper analyzes
and groups different data set properties which are often used
in literature to evaluate the quality of network-based data sets.
The main contribution of this survey is an exhaustive literature
overview of network-based data sets and an analysis as to
which data set fulfills which data set properties. The paper
focuses on attack scenarios within data sets and highlights
relations between the data sets. Furthermore, we briefly touch
upon traffic generators and data repositories as further sources
for network traffic besides typical data sets and provide some
observations and recommendations. As a primary benefit, this
survey establishes a collection of data set properties as a
basis for comparing available data sets and for identifying
suitable data sets, given specific evaluation scenarios. Further,
we created a website 1 which references to all mentioned data
sets and data repositories and we intend to update this website.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next
section discusses related work. Section III analyzes packet-
and flow-based network data in more detail. Section IV
discusses typical data set properties which are often used in
the literature to evaluate the quality of intrusion detection
data sets. Section V gives an overview of existing data sets
and checks each data set against the identified properties of
Section IV. Section VI briefly touches upon further sources
for network-based data. Observations and recommendations
are discussed in Section VII before the paper concludes with
a summary.
II. RELATED WORK
This section reviews related work on network-based data
sets for intrusion detection. It should be noted that host-based
intrusion detection data sets like ADFA [23] are not considered
in this paper. Interested readers may find details on host-based
intrusion detection data in Glass-Vanderlan et al. [24].
Malowidzki et al. [18] discuss missing data sets as a
significant problem for intrusion detection, set up requirements
for good data sets, and list available data sets. Koch et al. [25]
1http://www.dmir.uni-wuerzburg.de/datasets/nids-ds
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2provide another overview of intrusion detection data sets,
analyze 13 data sources, and evaluate them with respect to 8
data set properties. Nehinbe [26] provides a critical evaluation
of data sets for IDS and intrusion prevention systems (IPS).
The author examines seven data sets from different sources
(e.g. DARPA data sets and DEFCON data sets), highlights
their limitations, and suggests methods for creating more
realistic data sets. Since many data sets are published in the
last four years, we continue previous work [18], [25], [26]
from 2011 to 2015, but offer a more up-to-date and more
detailed overview than our predecessors.
While many data set papers (e.g., CIDDS-002 [27],
ISCX [28] or UGR’16 [29]) give just a brief overview of
some intrusion detection data sets, Sharafaldin et al. [30]
provide a more exhaustive review. Their main contribution
is a new framework for generating intrusion detection data
sets. Sharafaldin et al. also analyze 11 available intrusion
detection data sets and evaluate them with respect to 11 data
set properties. In contrast to earlier data set papers, our work
focuses on providing a neutral overview of existing network-
based data sets rather than contributing an additional data set.
Other recent papers also touch upon network-based data
sets, yet with a different primary focus. Bhuyan et al. [31]
present a comprehensive review of network anomaly detection.
The authors describe nine existing data sets and analyze data
sets which are used by existing anomaly detection methods.
Similarly, Nisioti et al. [32] focus on unsupervised methods
for intrusion detection and briefly refer to 12 existing network-
based data sets. Yavanoglu and Aydos [33] analyze and com-
pare the most commonly used data sets for intrusion detection.
However, their review contains only seven data sets including
other data sets like HTTP CSIC 2010 [34]. All in all, these
works tend to have different research objectives and only touch
upon network-based data sets marginally.
III. DATA
Normally, network traffic is captured either in packet-based
or flow-based format. Capturing network traffic on packet-
level is usually done by mirroring ports on network devices.
Packet-based data encompass complete payload information.
Flow-based data are more aggregated and usually contain only
metadata from network connections. Wheelus et al. highlight
the distinction through an illustrative comparison: "A good
example of the difference between captured packet inspection
and NetFlow would be viewing a forest by hiking through
the forest as opposed to flying over the forest in a hot air
balloon" [35]. In this work, a third category (other data) is
introduced. The category other has no standard format and
varies for each data set.
A. Packet-based data
Packet-based data is commonly captured in pcap format and
contains payload. Available metadata depends on the used
network and transport protocols. There are many different
protocols and the most important ones being TCP, UDP, ICMP
and IP. Figure 1 illustrates the different headers. TCP is
a reliable transport protocol and encompasses metadata like
Fig. 1. IP, TCP, UDP and ICMP header after [36].
sequence number, acknowledgment number, TCP flags, or
checksum values. UDP is a connection-less transport protocol
and has a smaller header than TCP which contains only
four fields, namely source port, destination port, length and
checksum. In contrast to TCP and UDP, ICMP is a supporting
protocol containing status messages and is thus even smaller.
Normally, there is also an IP header available beside the header
of the transport protocol. The IP header provides information
such as source and destination IP addresses and is also shown
in Figure 1.
B. Flow-based data
Flow-based network data is a more condensed format which
contains mainly meta information about network connections.
Flow-based data aggregate all packets which share some
properties within a time window into one flow and usually
do not include any payload. The default five-tuple definition,
i.e., source IP address, source port, destination IP address,
destination port and transport protocol [37], is a widely used
3TABLE I
ATTRIBUTES IN FLOW-BASED NETWORK TRAFFIC.
# Attribute
1 Date first seen
2 Duration
3 Transport protocol
4 Source IP address
5 Source port
6 Destination IP address
7 Destination port
8 Number of transmitted bytes
9 Number of transmitted packets
10 TCP flags
standard for matching properties in flow-based data. Flows
can appear in unidirectional or bidirectional format. The
unidirectional format aggregates all packets from host A to
host B which share the above mentioned properties into one
flow. All packets from host B to host A are aggregated into
another unidirectional flow. In contrast, a bidirectional flow
summarizes all packets between hosts A and B, regardless of
direction.
Typical flow-based formats are NetFlow [38], IPFIX [37],
sFlow [39] and OpenFlow [40]. Table I gives an overview of
typical attributes within flow-based network traffic. Depending
on the specific flow format and flow exporter, additional
attributes like bytes per second, bytes per packet, TCP flags of
the first packet, or even the calculated entropy of the payload
can be extracted.
Furthermore, it is possible to convert packet-based data to
flow-based data (but not vice versa) with tools like nfdump2
or YAF3. Readers interested in the differences between flow
exporters may find additional details in [41], together with
an analysis of how different flow exporters affect botnet
classification.
C. Other data
This category includes all data sets that are neither purely
packet-based nor flow-based. An example of this category
might be flow-based data sets which have been enriched with
additional information from packet-based data or host-based
log files. The KDD CUP 1999 [42] data set is a well-known
representative of this category. Each data point has network-
based attributes like the number of transmitted source bytes or
TCP flags, but has also host-based attributes like number of
failed logins. As a consequence, each data set of this category
has its own set of attributes. Since each data set must be
analyzed individually, we do not make any general statements
about available attributes.
IV. DATA SET PROPERTIES
To be able to compare different intrusion detection data sets
side by side and to help researchers finding appropriate data
sets for their specific evaluation scenario, it is necessary to
define common properties as evaluation basis. Therefore, we
explore typical data set properties that are used in the literature
2https://github.com/phaag/nfdump
3https://tools.netsa.cert.org/yaf/
to assess intrusion detection data sets. The general concept
FAIR [43] defines four principles that scholarly data should
fulfill, namely Findability, Accessibility, Interoperability and
Reusability. While concurring with this general concept, this
work uses more detailed data set properties to provide a
focused comparison of network-based intrusion detection data
sets. Generally, different data sets emphasize different data set
properties. For instance, the UGR’16 data set [29] emphasizes
a long recording time to capture periodic effects while the
ISCX data set [28] focuses on accurate labeling. Since we
aim at investigating more general properties for network-based
intrusion detection data sets, we try to unify and generalize
properties used in literature rather than adopting all of them.
For example, some approaches evaluate the presence of spe-
cific kind of attacks like DoS (Denial of Service) or Browser
injections. The presence of certain attack types may be a
relevant property for evaluating detection approaches for those
specific attack types, but are meaningless for other approaches.
Hence, we use the general property attacks which describes the
presence of malicious network traffic (see Table III). Section V
provides more details on the different attack types in the data
sets together with a discussion of other particular properties.
We do not develop an evaluation score like Haider et al. [19]
or Sharafaldin et al. [30] since we do not want to judge the
importance of different data set properties. In our opinion,
the importance of certain properties depends on the specific
evaluation scenario and should not be generally judged in a
survey. Rather, readers should be put in a position to find
suitable data sets for their needs. Therefore, we group the data
set properties discussed below in five categories to support
systematic search. Figure 2 summarizes all data set properties
and their value ranges.
A. General Information
The following four properties reflect general information
about the data set, namely the year of creation, availability,
presence of normal and malicious network traffic.
1) Year of Creation: Since network traffic is subject to
concept drift and new attack scenarios appear daily, the age
of an intrusion detection data set plays an important role. This
property describes the year of creation. The year in which the
underlying network traffic of a data set was captured is more
relevant for up-to-dateness than the year of its publication.
2) Public Availability: Intrusion detection data sets should
be publicly available to serve as a basis for comparing different
intrusion detection methods. Furthermore, the quality of data
sets can only be checked by third parties if they are publicly
available. Table III encompasses three different characteristics
for this property: yes, o.r. (on request), and no. On request
means that access will be granted after sending a message to
the authors or the responsible person.
3) Normal User Behavior: This property indicates the
availability of normal user behavior within a data set and
takes the values yes or no. The value yes indicates that there
is normal user behavior within the data set, but it does not
make any statements about the presence of attacks. In general,
the quality of an IDS is primarily determined by its attack
4Fig. 2. Data set properties and their value ranges.
detection rate and false alarm rate. Therefore, the presence of
normal user behavior is indispensable for evaluating an IDS.
The absence of normal user behavior, however, does not make
a data set unusable, but rather indicates that it has to be merged
with other data sets or with real world network traffic. Such a
merging step is often called overlaying or salting [44], [45].
4) Attack Traffic: IDS data sets should include various
attack scenarios. This property indicates the presence of ma-
licious network traffic within a data set and has the value yes
if the data set contains at least one attack. Table IV provides
additional information about the specific attack types.
B. Nature of Data
Properties of this category describe the format of the data
sets and the presence of meta information.
1) Metadata: Content-related interpretation of packet-
based and flow-based network traffic is difficult for third par-
ties. Therefore, data sets should come along with metadata to
provide additional information about the network structure, IP
addresses, attack scenarios and so on. This property indicates
the presence of additional metadata.
2) Format: Network intrusion detection data sets appear in
different formats. We roughly divide them into three formats
(see Section III). (1) Packet-based network traffic (e.g. pcap)
contains network traffic with payload. (2) Flow-based network
traffic (e.g. NetFlow) contains only meta information about
network connections. (3) Other types of data sets may contain,
e.g., flow-based traces with additional attributes from packet-
based data or even from host-based log files.
3) Anonymity: Frequently, intrusion detection data sets
may not be published due to privacy reasons or are only
available in anonymized form. This property indicates if data
is anonymized and which attributes are affected. The value
none in Table III indicates that no anonymization has been
performed. The value yes (IPs) means that IP addresses are
either anonymized or removed from the data set. Similarly, yes
(payload) indicates that payload information is anonymized or
removed from packet-based network traffic.
5C. Data Volume
Properties in this category characterize data sets in terms of
volume and duration.
1) Count: The property count describes a data set’s size
as either the number of contained packets/flows/points or the
physical size in Gigabyte (GB).
2) Duration: Data sets should cover network traffic over
a long time for capturing periodical effects (e.g., daytime vs.
night or weekday vs. weekend) [29]. The property duration
provides the recording time of each data set.
D. Recording Environment
Properties in this category delineate the network environ-
ment and conditions in which the data sets are captured.
1) Kind of Traffic: The property Kind of Traffic describes
three possible origins of network traffic: real, emulated, or syn-
thetic. Real means that real network traffic was captured within
a productive network environment. Emulated means that real
network traffic was captured within a test bed or emulated
network environment. Synthetic means that the network traffic
was created synthetically (e.g., through a traffic generator) and
not captured by a real (or virtual) network device.
2) Type of Network: Network environments in small and
medium-sized companies are fundamentally different from
internet service providers (ISP). As a consequence, different
environments require different security systems and evaluation
data sets should be adapted to the specific environment. This
property describes the underlying network environment in
which the respective data set was created.
3) Complete Network: This property is adopted from
Sharafaldin et al. [30] and indicates if the data set contains
the complete network traffic from a network environment with
several hosts, router and so on. If the data set contains only
network traffic from a single host (e.g., honeypot) or only
some protocols from the network traffic (e.g., exclusively SSH
traffic), the value is set to no.
E. Evaluation
The following properties are related to the evaluation of in-
trusion detection methods using network-based data sets. More
precisely, the properties denote the availability of predefined
subsets, the data set’s balance, and the presence of labels.
1) Predefined Splits: Sometimes it is difficult to compare
the quality of different IDS, even if they are evaluated on
the same data set. In that case, it must be clarified whether
the same subsets are used for training and evaluation. This
property provides the information if a data set comes along
with predefined subsets for training and evaluation.
2) Balanced: Often, machine learning and data mining
methods are used for anomaly-based intrusion detection. In the
training phase of such methods (e.g., decision tree classifiers),
data sets should be balanced with respect to their class labels.
Consequently, data sets should contain the same number
of data points from each class (normal and attack). Real-
world network traffic, however, is not balanced and contains
more normal user behavior than attack traffic. This property
indicates if data sets are balanced with respect to their class
labels. Imbalanced data sets should be balanced by appropriate
preprocessing before data mining algorithms are used. He
and Garcia [46] provide a good overview of learning from
imbalanced data.
3) Labeled: Labeled data sets are necessary for training
supervised methods and for evaluating supervised as well
as unsupervised intrusion detection methods. This property
denotes if data sets are labeled or not. If there are at least
the two classes normal and attack, this property is set to
yes. Possible values in this property are: yes, yes with BG.
(yes with background), yes (IDS), indirect, and no. Yes with
background means that there is a third class background.
Packets, flows, or data points which belong to the class
background could be normal or attack. Yes (IDS) means that
some kind of intrusion detection system was used to create the
data set’s labels. Some labels of the data set might be wrong
since an IDS might be imperfect. Indirect means that the data
set has no explicit labels, but labels can be created on one’s
own from additional log files.
V. DATA SETS
In our opinion, the data set properties Labeled and Format
are the most decisive properties when searching for adequate
network-based data sets. The intrusion detection method (su-
pervised or unsupervised) determines if labels are necessary or
not and which kind of data is required (packet, flow or other).
Therefore, Table II provides a classification of all investigated
network-based data sets with respect to these two properties. A
more detailed overview of network-based intrusion detection
data sets with respect to the data set properties of Section IV
is given in Table III. The presence of specific attack scenarios
is an important aspect when searching for a network-based
data set. Therefore, Table III indicates the presence of attack
traffic while Table IV provides details on specific attacks
within a data set. Papers on data sets describe attacks on
different abstraction levels. Vasudevan et al. [47], for instance,
characterized attack traffic within their data set (SSENET-
2011) as follows: "Nmap, Nessus, Angry IP scanner, Port
Scanner, Metaploit, Backtrack OS, LOIC, etc., were some of
the attack tools used by the participants to launch the attacks.".
In contrast, Ring et al. specify the number and different types
of executed port scans in their CIDDS-002 data set [27].
Consequently, the abstraction level of attack descriptions may
vary in Table IV. A detailed description of all attack types
is beyond the scope of this work. Rather, we refer interested
readers to the open access paper "From Intrusion Detection to
an Intrusion Response System: Fundamentals, Requirements,
and Future Directions" by Anwar et al. [48].
Further, some data sets are modifications or combinations
of others. Figure 3 shows the interrelationships among several
well-known data sets.
Network-based data sets in alphabetical order
AWID [49]. AWID is a publicly available data set4 which is
focused on 802.11 networks. Its creators used a small network
4http://icsdweb.aegean.gr/awid/index.html
6TABLE II
DECISION SUPPORT TABLE FOR FINDING APPROPRIATE NETWORK-BASED
DATA SETS. SOME DATA SETS LIKE CTU-13 PROVIDE SEVERAL DATA
FORMATS AND APPEAR IN SEVERAL COLUMNS. (+) INDICATES THAT THE
DATA SET IS PUBLICLY AVAILABLE. (?) INDICATES THAT WE WERE NOT
ABLE TO FIND THE DATA SET. (-) INDICATES THAT THE DATA SET IS NOT
PUBLICLY AVAILABLE.
Format
Labeled packet flow other
yes (+) Botnet (+) CICIDS 2017 (+) AWID
(+) CIC DoS (+) CIDDS-001 (+) KDD CUP 99
(+) CICIDS 2017 (+) CIDDS-002 (+) Kyoto 2006+
(+) DARPA (+) ISCX 2012 (+) NSL-KDD
(+) DDoS 2016 (+) TUIDS (+) UNSW-NB 15
(+) ISCX 2012 (+) Twente
(+) ISOT
(+) NDSec-1
(+) NGIDS-DS
(+) TRAbID
(+) TUIDS
(+) UNSW-NB15
(?) PU-IDS
(?) SSENET-2011
(?) SSENET-2014
(-) IRSC (-) IRSC (-) SANTA
yes with BG (+) CTU-13 (+) CTU-13
(+) UGR’16
yes (IDS) (?) PUF
indirect (+) SSHCure
no (+) Booters (+) Kent 2016
(+) CDX (+) UNIBS
(+) LBNL (+) Unified Host
and Network
environment (11 clients) and captured WLAN traffic in packet-
based format. In one hour, 37 million packets were captured.
156 attributes are extracted from each packet. Malicious net-
work traffic was generated by executing 16 specific attacks
against the 802.11 network. AWID is labeled and split into a
training and a test subset.
Booters [50]. Booters are Distributed Denial of Service
(DDoS) attacks offered as a service by criminals. Santanna
et. al [50] published a data set which includes traces of
nine different booter attacks which were executed against
a null-routed IP address within their network environment.
The resulting data set is recorded in packet-based format and
consists of more than 250GB of network traffic. Individual
packets are not labeled, but the different booter attacks are
split into different files. The data set is publicly available5,
but names of booters are anonymized for privacy reasons.
Botnet [5]. The Botnet data set is a combination of existing
data sets and is publicly available6. The creators of Botnet
used the overlay methodology of [44] to combine (parts of)
the ISOT [57], ISCX 2012 [28] and CTU-13 [3] data sets.
The resulting data set contains various botnets and normal
user behavior. The Botnet data set is divided into a 5.3 GB
training subset and a 8.5 GB test subset, both in packet-based
format.
CIC DoS [51]. CIC DoS is a data set from the Canadian
Institute for Cybersecurity and is publicly available7. The
authors’ intention was to create an intrusion detection data
5https://www.simpleweb.org/wiki/index.php
6http://www.unb.ca/cic/datasets/botnet.html
7http://www.unb.ca/cic/datasets/dos-dataset.html
Fig. 3. Relationships between the data sets in Table III.
set with application layer DoS attacks. Therefore, the authors
executed eight different DoS attacks on the application layer.
Normal user behavior was generated by combining the result-
ing traces with attack-free traffic from the ISCX 2012 [28]
data set. The resulting data set is available in packet-based
format and contains 24 hours of network traffic.
CICIDS 2017 [22]. CICIDS 2017 was created within an
emulated environment over a period of 5 days and contains
network traffic in packet-based and bidirectional flow-based
format. For each flow, the authors extracted more than 80
attributes and provide additional metadata about IP addresses
and attacks. Normal user behavior is executed through scripts.
The data set contains a wide range of attack types like
SSH brute force, heartbleed, botnet, DoS, DDoS, web and
infiltration attacks. CICIDS 2017 is publicly available8.
CIDDS-001 [21]. The CIDDS-001 data set was captured
within an emulated small business environment in 2017,
contains four weeks of unidirectional flow-based network
8http://www.unb.ca/cic/datasets/ids-2017.html
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8TABLE IV
ATTACKS WITHIN THE NETWORK-BASED DATA SETS OF TABLE III.
SPECIFIC ATTACK INFORMATION (E.G. NAME OF THE EXECUTED BOTNET)
AND USED TOOLS ARE PROVIDED IN ROUND BRACKETS IF AVAILABLE.
Data Set Attacks
AWID [49] Popular attacks on 802.11 (e.g. authentication
request, ARP flooding, injection, probe request)
Booters [50] 9 different DDoS attacks
Botnet [5] botnets (Menti, Murlo, Neris, NSIS, Rbot, Sogou,
Strom, Virut, Zeus)
CIC DoS [51] Application layer DoS attacks (executed through
ddossim, Goldeneye, hulk, RUDY, Slowhttptest,
Slowloris)
CICIDS 2017 [22] botnet (Ares), cross-site-scripting, DoS (exe-
cuted through Hulk, GoldenEye, Slowloris, and
Slowhttptest), DDoS (executed through LOIC),
heartbleed, infiltration, SSH brute force, SQL
injection
CIDDS-001 [21] DoS, port scans (ping-scan, SYN-Scan), SSH
brute force
CIDDS-002 [27] port scans (ACK-Scan, FIN-Scan, ping-Scan,
UDP-Scan, SYN-Scan)
CDX [52] not specified
CTU-13 [3] botnets (Menti, Murlo, Neris, NSIS, Rbot, Sogou,
Virut)
DARPA [53], [54] DoS, privilege escalation (remote-to-local and
user-to-root), probing
DDoS 2016 [55] DDoS (HTTP flood, SIDDOS, smurf ICMP flood,
UDP flood)
IRSC [56] n.s.
ISCX 2012 [28] Four attack scenarios (1: Infiltrating the network
from the inside; 2: HTTP DoS; 3: DDoS using
an IRC botnet; 4: SSH brute force)
ISOT [57] botnet (Storm, Waledac)
KDD CUP 99 [42] DoS, privilege escalation (remote-to-local and
user-to-root), probing
Kent 2016 [58], [59] not specified
Kyoto 2006+ [60] Various attacks against honeypots (e.g. backscat-
ter, DoS, exploits, malware, port scans, shellcode)
LBNL [61] port scans
NDSec-1 [62] botnet (Citadel), brute force (against FTP, HTTP
and SSH), DDoS (HTTP floods, SYN flooding
and UDP floods), exploits, probe, spoofing, SSL
proxy, XSS/SQL injection
NGIDS-DS [19] backdoors, DoS, exploits, generic, reconnais-
sance, shellcode, worms
NSL-KDD [63] DoS, privilege escalation (remote-to-local and
user-to-root), probing
PU-IDS [64] DoS, privilege escalation (remote-to-local and
user-to-root), probing
PUF [65] DNS attacks
SANTA [35] (D)DoS (ICMP flood, RUDY, SYN flood), DNS
amplification, heartbleed, port scans
SSENET-2011 [47] DoS (executed through LOIC), port scans (exe-
cuted through Angry IP Scanner, Nessus, Nmap),
various attack tools (e.g. metasploit)
SSENET-2014 [66] botnet, flooding, privilege escalation, port scans
SSHCure [67] SSH attacks
TRAbID [68] DoS (HTTP flood, ICMP flood, SMTP flood,
SYN flood, TCP keepalive), port scans (ACK-
Scan, FIN-Scan, NULL-Scan, OS Fingerprinting,
Service Fingerprinting, UDP-Scan, XMAS-Scan)
TUIDS [69], [70] botnet (IRC), DDoS (Fraggle flood, Ping flood,
RST flood, smurf ICMP flood, SYN flood, UDP
flood), port scans (e.g. FIN-Scan, NULL-Scan,
UDP-Scan, XMAS-Scan), coordinated port scan,
SSH brute force
Twente [71] Attacks against a honeypot with three open ser-
vices (FTP, HTTP, SSH)
UGR’16 [29] botnet (Neris), DoS, port scans, SSH brute force,
spam
UNIBS [72] none
Unified Host and
Network [73]
not specified
UNSW-NB15 [20] backdoors, DoS, exploits, fuzzers, generic, port
scans, reconnaissance, shellcode, spam, worms
traffic, and comes along with a detailed technical report
with additional information. As special feature, the data set
encompasses an external server which was attacked in the
internet. In contrast to honeypots, this server was also regularly
used by the clients from the emulated environment. Normal
and malicious user behavior was executed through python
scripts which are publicly available on GitHub9. These scripts
allow an ongoing generation of new data sets and can be
used by other researches. The CIDDS-001 data set is publicly
available10 and contains SSH brute force, DoS and port scan
attacks as well as several attacks captured from the wild.
CIDDS-002 [27]. CIDDS-002 is a port scan data set which
is created based on the scripts of CIDDS-001. The data set
contains two weeks of unidirectional flow-based network traf-
fic within an emulated small business environment. CIDDS-
002 contains normal user behavior as well as a wide range of
different port scan attacks. A technical report provides addi-
tional meta information about the data set where external IP
addresses are anonymized. The data set is publicly available11.
CDX [52]. Sangster el al. [52] propose a concept to create
network-based data sets from network warfare competitions
and discuss the advantages and disadvantages of such an
approach comprehensively. The CDX data set contains net-
work traffic of a four day network warfare competition in
2009. The traffic is recorded in packet-based format and is
publicly available12. CDX contains normal user behaviour as
well as several types of attacks. An additional plan describes
metadata about the network structure and IP addresses, but the
individual packets are not labeled. Further, host-based log files
and warnings from an IDS are available.
CTU-13 [3]. The CTU-13 data set was captured in the year
2013 and is available in three formats: packet, unidirectional
flow, and bidirectional flow13. It was captured in a university
network and distinguishes 13 scenarios containing different
botnet attacks. Additional information about infected hosts is
provided at the website. Traffic was labeled using a three stage
approach. In the first stage, all traffic to and from infected
hosts is labeled as botnet. In the second stage, traffic which
matches specific filters is labeled as normal. Remaining traffic
is labeled as background. Consequently, background traffic
could be normal or malicious. The authors recommend a split
of their data set into training and test subsets [3].
DARPA [53], [54], [74]. The DARPA 1998/99 data sets are
the most popular data sets for intrusion detection and were
created at the MIT Lincoln Lab within an emulated network
environment. The DARPA 1998 and DARPA 1999 data sets
contain seven and, respectively, five weeks of network traffic
in packet-based format, including various kinds of attacks
like DoS, buffer overflow, port scans, or rootkits. Additional
information as well as download links can be found at the
website14. In spite (or because) of their wide distribution, the
9https://github.com/markusring/CIDDS
10http://www.hs-coburg.de/cidds
11http://www.hs-coburg.de/cidds
12https://www.usma.edu/crc/sitepages/datasets.aspx
13https://mcfp.weebly.com/the-ctu-13-dataset-a-labeled-dataset-with-botnet-normal-and-background-traffic.
html
14https://www.ll.mit.edu/ideval/docs/index.html
9data sets are often criticized for artificial attack injections or
the large amount of redundancy [63], [75].
DDoS 2016 [55]. Alkasassbeh et al. [55] published a packet-
based data set which was created using the network simula-
tor NS2 in 2016. Detailed information about the simulated
network environment is not available. The DDoS 2016 data
set focuses on different types of DDoS attacks. In addition
to normal network traffic, the data set contains four different
types of DDoS attacks: UDP flood, smurf, HTTP flood, and
SIDDOS. The data set contains 2.1 million packets and can
be downloaded at researchgate15.
IRSC [56]. The IRSC data set was recorded in 2015,
using an inventive approach. Real network traffic with normal
user behavior and attacks from the internet were captured. In
addition to that, additional attacks were run manually. The IDS
SNORT16 and manual inspection were used for labeling. Since
the data set is not publicly available due to privacy concerns,
we are not able to fill all properties in Table III.
ISCX 2012 [28]. The ISCX data set was created in 2012
by capturing traffic in an emulated network environment over
one week. The authors used a dynamic approach to generate an
intrusion detection data set with normal as well as malicious
network behavior. So-called α profiles define attack scenarios
while β profiles characterize normal user behavior like writing
e-mails or browsing the web. These profiles are used to create
a new data set in packet-based and bidirectional flow-based
format. The dynamic approach allows an ongoing generation
of new data sets. ISCX can be downloaded at the website17
and contains various types of attacks like SSH brute force,
DoS or DDoS.
ISOT [57]. The ISOT data set was created in 2010 by
combining normal network traffic from Traffic Lab at Ericsson
Research in Hungary [76] and the Lawrence Berkeley National
Lab (LBNL) [61] with malicious network traffic from the
French chapter of the honeynet project18. ISOT was used for
detecting P2P botnets [57]. The resulting data set is publicly
available19 and contains 11 GB of packet-based data in pcap
format.
KDD CUP 99 [42]. KDD CUP 99 is based on the DARPA
data set and among the most widespread data sets for intrusion
detection. Since it is neither in standard packet-, nor in flow-
based format, it belongs to category other. The data set
contains basic attributes about TCP connections and high-level
attributes like number of failed logins, but no IP addresses.
KDD CUP 99 encompasses more than 20 different types of
attacks (e.g. DoS or buffer overflow) and comes along with an
explicit test subset. The data set includes 5 million data points
and can be downloaded freely20.
Kent 2016 [58], [59]. This data set was captured over
58 days at the Los Alamos National Laboratory network. It
15https://www.researchgate.net/publication/292967044_Dataset-_
Detecting_Distributed_Denial_of_Service_Attacks_Using_Data_Mining_
Techniques
16https://www.snort.org/
17http://www.unb.ca/cic/datasets/ids.html
18http://honeynet.org/chapters/france
19https://www.uvic.ca/engineering/ece/isot/datasets/
20http://kdd.ics.uci.edu/databases/kddcup99/kddcup99.html
contains around 130 million flows of unidirectional flow-based
network traffic as well as several host-based log files. Network
traffic is heavily anonymized for privacy reasons. The data set
is not labeled and can be downloaded at the website21.
Kyoto 2006+ [60]. Kyoto 2006+ is a publicly available
honeypot data set22 which contains real network traffic, but
includes only a small amount and a small range of realistic
normal user behavior. Kyoto 2006+ is categorized as other
since the IDS Bro23 was used to convert packet-based traffic
into a new format called sessions. Each session comprises 24
attributes, 14 out of which characterize statistical information
inspired by the KDD CUP 99 data set. The remaining 10
attributes are typical flow-based attributes like IP addresses
(in anonymized form), ports, or duration. A label attribute
indicates the presence of attacks. Data were captured over
three years. As a consequence of that unusually long recording
period, the data set contains about 93 million sessions.
LBNL [61]. Research on intrusion detection data sets often
refers to the LBNL data set. Thus, for the sake of complete-
ness, this data set is also added to the list. The creation of the
LNBL data set was mainly motivated by analyzing character-
istics of network traffic within enterprise networks, rather than
publishing intrusion detection data. According to its creators,
the data set might still be used as background traffic for
security researchers as it contains almost exclusively normal
user behavior. The data set is not labeled, but anonymized for
privacy reasons, and contains more than 100 hours of network
traffic in packet-based format. The data set can be downloaded
at the website24.
NDSec-1 [62]. The NDSec-1 data set is remarkable since
it is designed as an attack composition for network security.
According to the authors, this data set can be reused to salt
existing network traffic with attacks using overlay method-
ologies like [44]. NDSec-1 is publicly available on request25
and was captured in packet-based format in 2016. It contains
additional syslog and windows event log information. The
attack composition of NDSec-1 encompasses botnet, brute
force attacks (against FTP, HTTP and SSH), DoS (HTTP
flooding, SYN flooding, UDP flooding), exploits, port scans,
spoofing, and XSS/SQL injection.
NGIDS-DS [19]. The NGIDS-DS data set contains network
traffic in packet-based format as well as host-based log files.
It was generated in an emulated environment, using the IXIA
Perfect Storm tool to generate normal user behavior as well
as attacks from seven different attack families (e.g. DoS
or worms). Consequently, the quality of the generated data
depends primarily on the IXIA Perfect Storm hardware26. The
labeled data set contains approximately 1 million packets and
is publicly available27.
NSL-KDD [63]. NSL-KDD enhances the KDD CUP 99.
A major criticism against the KDD CUP 99 data set is the
21https://csr.lanl.gov/data/cyber1/
22http://www.takakura.com/Kyoto_data/
23https://www.bro.org/
24http://icir.org/enterprise-tracing/
25http://www2.hs-fulda.de/NDSec/NDSec-1/
26https://www.ixiacom.com/products/perfectstorm
27https://research.unsw.edu.au/people/professor-jiankun-hu
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large amount of redundancy [63]. Therefore, the authors of
NSL-KDD removed duplicates from the KDD CUP 99 data
set and created more sophisticated subsets. The resulting data
set contains about 150,000 data points and is divided into
predefined training and test subsets for intrusion detection
methods. NSL-KDD uses the same attributes as KDD CUP
99 and belongs to the category other. Yet, it should be noted
that the underlying network traffic of NSL-KDD dates back
to the year 1998. The data set is publicly available28.
PU-IDS [64]. The PU-IDS data set is a derivative of the
NSL-KDD data set. The authors developed a generator which
extracts statistics of an input data set and uses these statistics
to generate new synthetic instances. As a consequence, the
work of Singh et al. [64] could be seen as a traffic generator
to create PU-IDS which contains about 200,000 data points
and has the same attributes and format as the NSL-KDD data
set. As NSL-KDD is based on KDD CUP 1999 which in turn
is extracted from DARPA 1998, the year of creation is set
to 1998 since the input for the traffic generator was captured
back then.
PUF [65]. Recently, Sharma et al. [65] published the flow-
based PUF data set which was captured over three days within
a campus network and contains exclusively DNS connections.
38,120 out of a total of 298,463 unidirectional flows are mali-
cious while the remaining ones reflect normal user activity. All
flows are labeled using logs of an intrusion prevention system.
For privacy reasons, IP addresses are removed from the data
set. The authors intend to make PUF publicly available.
SANTA [35]. The SANTA data set was captured within
an ISP environment and contains real network traffic. The
network traffic is labeled through an exhaustive manual pro-
cedure and stored in a so-called session-based format. This
data format is similar to NetFlow but enriched with addi-
tional attributes which are calculated by using information
from packet-based data. The authors spent much effort on
the generation of additional attributes which should enhance
intrusion detection methods. SANTA is not publicly available.
SSENet-2011 [47]. SSENet-2011 was captured within an
emulated environment over four hours. It contains several
attacks like DoS or port scans. Browsing activities of par-
ticipants generated normal user behavior. Each data point is
characterized by 24 attributes. The data set belongs to the
category other since the tool Tstat was used to extract adjusted
data points from packet-based traffic. We found no information
about public availability.
SSENet-2014 [66]. SSENet-2014 is created by extracting
attributes from the packet-based files of SSENet-2011 [47].
Thus, like SSENet-2011, the data set is categorized as other.
The authors extracted 28 attributes for each data point which
describe host-based and network-based attributes. The created
attributes are in line with KDD CUP 1999. SSENet-2014
contains 200,000 labeled data points and is divided into a
training and test subnet. SSENet-2014 is the only known data
set with a balanced training subset. Again, no information on
public availability could be found.
28http://www.unb.ca/cic/datasets/nsl.html
SSHCure [67]. Hofstede et al. [67] propose SSHCure, a
tool for SSH attack detection. To evaluate their work, the
authors captured two data sets (each with a period of one
month) within a university network. The resulting data sets
are publicly available29 and contain exclusively SSH network
traffic. The flow-based network traffic is not directly labeled.
Instead, the authors provide additional host-based logs files
which may be used to check if SSH login attempts were
successful or not.
TRAbID [68]. Viegas et al. proposed the TRAbID database
[68] in 2017. This database contains 16 different scenarios
for evaluating IDS. Each scenario was captured within an
emulated environment (1 honeypot server and 100 clients).
In each scenario, the traffic was captured for a period of 30
minutes and some attacks were executed. To label the network
traffic, the authors used the IP addresses of the clients. All
clients were Linux machines. Some clients exclusively per-
formed attacks while most of the clients exclusively handled
normal user requests to the honeypot server. Normal user
behavior includes HTTP, SMTP, SSH and SNMP traffic while
malicious network traffic encompasses port scans and DoS
attacks. TRAbID is publicly available30.
TUIDS [69], [70]. The labeled TUIDS data set can be
divided into three parts: TUIDS Intrusion data set, TUIDS
coordinated scan data set and TUIDS DDoS data set. As
the names already indicate, the data sets contain normal
user behavior and primarily attacks like port scans or DDoS.
Data were generated within an emulated environment which
contains around 250 clients. Traffic was captured in packet-
based and bidirectional flow-based format. Each subset spans
a period of seven days and all three subsets contain around
250,000 flows. Unfortunately, the link31 to the data set in
the original publication seems to be outdated. However, the
authors respond to e-mail requests.
Twente [71]. Sperotto et al. [71] published one of the first
flow-based intrusion detection data sets in 2008. This data set
spans six days of traffic involving a honeypot server which
offers web, FTP, and SSH services. Due to this approach, the
data set contains only network traffic from the honeypot and
nearly all flows are malicious without normal user behavior.
The authors analyzed log files and traffic in packet-based
format for labeling the flows of this data set. The data set
is publicly available32 and IP addresses were removed due to
privacy concerns.
UGR’16 [29]. UGR’16 is a unidirectional flow-based data
set. Its focus lies on capturing periodic effects in an ISP
environment. Thus, it spans a period of four months and
contains 16,900 million unidirectional flows. IP addresses are
anonymized and the flows are labeled as normal, background,
or attack. The authors explicitly executed several attacks
(botnet, DoS, and port scans) within that data set. The corre-
sponding flows are labeled as attacks and some other attacks
were identified and manually labeled as attack. Injected normal
user behavior and traffic which matches certain patterns are
29https://www.simpleweb.org/wiki/index.php
30https://secplab.ppgia.pucpr.br/trabid
31http://agnigarh.tezu.ernet.in/~dkb/resources.html
32https://www.simpleweb.org/wiki/index.php
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labeled as normal. However, most of the traffic is labeled as
background which could be normal or an attack. The data set
is publicly available33.
UNIBS 2009 [72]. Like LBNL [61], the UNIBS 2009 data
set was not created for intrusion detection. Since UNIBS 2009
is referenced in other work, it is still added to the list. Gringoli
et al. [72] used the data set to identify applications (e.g.
web browsers, Skype or mail clients) based on their flow-
based network traffic. UNIBS 2009 contains around 79,000
flows without malicious behavior. Since the labels just describe
the application protocols of the flows, network traffic is not
categorized as normal or attack. Consequently, the property
label in the categorization scheme is set to no. The data set is
publicly available34.
Unified Host and Network Data Set [73]. This data set
contains host and network-based data which were captured
within a real environment, the LANL (Los Alamos National
Laboratory) enterprise network. For privacy reasons, attributes
like IP addresses and timestamps were anoynmized in bidirec-
tional flow-based network traffic files. The network traffic was
collected for a period of 90 days and has no labels. The data
set is publicly available35.
UNSW-NB15 [20]. The UNSW-NB15 data set encompasses
normal and malicious network traffic in packet-based format
which was created using the IXIA Perfect Storm tool in a
small emulated environment over 31 hours. It contains nine
different families of attacks like backdoors, DoS, exploits,
fuzzers, or worms. The data set is also available in flow-
based format with additional attributes. UNSW-NB15 comes
along with predefined splits for training and test. The data set
includes 45 distinct IP addresses and is publicly available36.
VI. OTHER DATA SOURCES
Besides network-based data sets, there are some other data
sources for packet-based and flow-based network traffic. In
the following, we shortly discuss data repositories and traffic
generators.
A. Data Repositories
Besides traditional data sets, several data repositories can
be found on the internet. Since type and structure of those
repositories differ greatly, we abstain from a tabular compar-
ison. Instead, we give a brief textual overview in alphabetical
order. Repositories have been checked on 26 February 2019
with respect to actuality.
AZSecure37. AZSecure is a repository of network data at
the University of Arizona for use by the research community.
It includes various data sets in pcap, arff and other formats
some of which are labeled, while other are not. AZSecure
encompasses, among others, the CTU-13 data set [3] or the
Unified Host and Network Data Set [73]. The repository is
managed and contains some recent data sets.
33https://nesg.ugr.es/nesg-ugr16/index.php
34http://netweb.ing.unibs.it/~ntw/tools/traces/)
35https://csr.lanl.gov/data/2017.html
36https://www.unsw.adfa.edu.au/unsw-canberra-cyber/cybersecurity/
ADFA-NB15-Datasets/
37https://www.azsecure-data.org/other-data.html
CAIDA38. CAIDA collects different types of data sets, with
varying degree of availability (public access or on request), and
provides a search engine. Generally, a form needs to be filled
out to gain access to some of the public data sets. Additionally,
most network-based data sets can exclusively be requested
through an IMPACT (see below) login since CAIDA supports
IMPACT as Data Provider. The repository is managed and
updated with new data.
Contagiodump39. Contagiodump is a blog about malware
dumps. There are several posts each year and the last post
was on 20th March 2018. The website contains, among other
things, a collection of pcap files from malware analysis.
covert.io40. Covert.io is a blog about security and machine
learning by Jason Trost. The blog maintains different lists of
tutorials, GitHub repositories, research papers and other blogs
concerning security, big data, and machine learning, but also
a collection of various security-based data resources41. The
latest entry was posted on August 14, 2017 by Jason Trost.
DEF CON CTF Archive42. DEF CON is a popular annual
hacker convention. The event includes a capture the flag (CTF)
competition where every team has to defend their own network
against the other teams whilst simultaneously hacking the
opponents’ networks. The competition is typically recorded
and available in packet-based format on the website. Given the
nature of the competition, the recorded data almost exclusively
contain attack traffic and little normal user behavior. The
website is current and updated annually with new data from
the CTF competitions.
IMPACT43. IMPACT Cyber Trust, formerly known as
PREDICT, is a community of data providers, cyber security
researchers as well as coordinators. IMPACT is administrated
and up-to-date. A data catalog is given on the site to browse
the data sets provided by the community. The data providers
are (among others) DARPA, the MIT Lincoln Laboratory,
or the UCSD - Center for Applied Internet Data Analysis
(CAIDA). However, the data sets can only be downloaded with
an account that may be requested exclusively by researchers
from eight selected countries approved by the US Department
of Homeland Security. As Germany is not among the approved
locations, no further statements about the data sets can be
made.
Internet Traffic Archive44. The Internet Traffic Archive is
a repository of internet traffic traces sponsored by ACM SIG-
COMM. The list includes four extensively anonymized packet-
based traces. In particular, the payload has been removed, all
timestamps are relative to the first packet, and IP addresses
have been changed to numerical representations. The packet-
based data sets were captured more than 20 years ago and can
be downloaded without restriction.
Kaggle45. Kaggle is an online platform for sharing and
38http://www.caida.org/data/overview/
39http://contagiodump.blogspot.com/
40http://www.covert.io
41http://www.covert.io/data-links/
42https://www.defcon.org/html/links/dc-ctf.html
43https://www.impactcybertrust.org/
44http://ita.ee.lbl.gov/html/traces.html
45https://www.kaggle.com/
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publishing data sets. The platform contains security-based
data sets like KDD CUP 99 and has a search function. It
allows registered users also to upload and explore data analysis
models.
Malware Traffic Analysis46. Malware Traffic Analysis is a
repository which contains blog posts and exercises related to
network traffic analysis, e.g. identifying malicious activities.
Exercises come along with packet-based network traffic which
is indirectly labeled through the provided answers to the
exercises. Downloadable files are secured with a password
which can be obtained from the website. The repository is
recent and new blog posts are issued almost daily.
Mid-Atlantic CCDC47. Similar to DEFCON CTF, MAC-
CDC is an annual competition hosted by the US National
CyberWatch Center where the captured packet-based traffic
of the competitions is made available. Teams have to assure
that services provided by their network are not interrupted in
any way. Similar to the DEFCON CTF archives, MACCDC
data contain almost exclusively attack traffic and little normal
user behavior. The latest competition took place in 2018.
MAWILab48. The MAWILab repository contains a huge
amount of network traffic over a long time which is captured
at a link between USA and Japan. For each day since 2007, the
repository contains a 15 minute trace in packet-based format.
For privacy reasons, IP addresses are anonymized and packet
payloads are omitted. The captured network traffic is labeled
using different anomaly detection methods [77].
MWS49. The anti malware engineering workshop (MWS)
is an annual workshop about malware in Japan. The workshop
comes along with several MWS data sets which contain
packet-based network data as well as host-based log files.
However, the data sets are only shared within the MWS com-
munity which consists of researches in industry and academia
in Japan [78]. The latest workshop took place in 2018.
NETRECSEC50. NETRECSEC maintains a comprehensive
list of publicly available pcap files on the internet. Similar to
SecRepo, NETRECSEC refers to many repositories mentioned
in this work, but also incorporates additional sources like
honeypot dumps or CTF events. Its up-to-dateness can only
be judged indirectly as NETRECSEC also refers to data traces
from the year 2018.
OpenML51. OpenML is an update-to-date platform for
sharing machine learning data sets. It contains also security-
based data sets like KDD CUP 99. The platform has a search
function and comes along with other possibilities like creating
scientific tasks.
RIPE Data Repository52. The RIPE data repository hosts a
number of data sets. Yet, no new data sets have been included
for several years. To obtain access, users need to create an
account and accept the terms and conditions of the data sets.
46http://malware-traffic-analysis.net/
47http://maccdc.org/
48http://www.fukuda-lab.org/mawilab/
49https://www.iwsec.org/mws/2018/en.html
50http://www.netresec.com/?page=PcapFiles
51https://www.openml.org/home
52https://labs.ripe.net/datarepository
The repository also mirrors some data available from the
Waikato Internet Traffic Storage (see below).
SecRepo53. SecRepo lists different samples of security
related data and is maintained by Mike Sconzo. The list is
divided in the following categories: Network, Malware, Sys-
tem, File, Password, Threat Feeds and Other. The very detailed
list contains references to typical data sets like DARPA, but
also to many repositories (e.g. NETRECSEC). The website
was last updated on November 20, 2018.
Simple Web54. Simple Web provides a database collec-
tion and information on network management tutorials and
software. The repository includes traces in different formats
like packet or flow-based network traffic. It is hosted by the
University of Twente, maintained by members of the DACS
(Design and Analysis of Communication Systems) group, and
updated with new results from this group.
UMassTraceRepository55. UMassTraceRepository
provides the research community with several traces of
network traffic. Some of these traces have been collected by
the suppliers of the archive themselves while others have
been donated. The archive includes 19 packet-based data
sets from different sources. The most recent data sets were
captured in 2018.
VAST Challenge56. The IEEE Visual Analytics Science
and Technology (VAST) challenge is an annual contest with
the goal of advancing the field of visual analytics through
competition. In some challenges, network traffic data were
provided for contest tasks. For instance, the second mini
challenge of the VAST 2011 competition involved an IDS log
consisting of packet-based network traffic in pcap format. A
similar setup was used in a follow-up VAST challenge in 2012.
Furthermore, a VAST challenge in 2013 deals with flow-based
network traffic.
WITS: Waikato Internet Traffic Storage57. This website
aims to list all internet traces possessed by the WAND
research group. The data sets are typically available in packet-
based format and free to download from the Waikato servers.
However, the repository has not been updated for a long time.
B. Traffic Generators
Another source of network traffic for intrusion detection
research are traffic generators. Traffic generators are models
which create synthetic network traffic. In most cases, traffic
generators use user-defined parameters or extract basic prop-
erties of real network traffic to create new synthetic network
traffic. While data sets and data repositories provide fixed data,
traffic generators allow the generation of network traffic which
can be adapted to certain network structures.
For instance, the traffic generators FLAME [79] and ID2T
[80] use real network traffic as input. This input traffic
should serve as a baseline for normal user behavior. Then,
FLAME and ID2T add malicious network traffic by editing
53http://www.secrepo.com/
54https://www.simpleweb.org/wiki/index.php/
55http://traces.cs.umass.edu/
56http://vacommunity.org/tiki-index.php
57https://wand.net.nz/wits/catalogue.php
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values of input traffic or by injecting synthetic flows under
consideration of typical attack patterns. Siska et al. [81]
present a graph-based flow generator which extracts traffic
templates from real network traffic. Then, their generator uses
these traffic templates in order to create new synthetic flow-
based network traffic. Ring et al. [82] adapted GANs for
generating synthetic network traffic. The authors use Improved
Wasserstein Generative Adversarial Networks (WGAN-GP) to
create flow-based network traffic. The WGAN-GP is trained
with real network traffic and learns traffic characteristics. After
training, the WGAN-GP is able to create new synthetic flow-
based network traffic with similar characteristics. Erlacher and
Dressler’s traffic generator GENESIDS [83] generates HTTP
attack traffic based on user defined attack descriptions. There
are many additional traffic generators which are not discussed
here for the sake of brevity. Besides those traffic generators,
there are many other traffic generators which are not discussed
here. Instead, we refer to Molnár et al. [84] for an overview
of traffic generators.
Brogi et al. [85] come up with another idea that in some
sense resembles traffic generators. Starting out from the prob-
lem of sharing data sets due to privacy concerns, they present
Moirai, a framework which allows users to share complete
scenarios instead of data sets. The idea behind Moirai is to
replay attack scenarios in virtual machines such that users can
generate data on the fly.
A third approach - which is also categorized into the larger
context of traffic generators - are frameworks which support
users to label real network traffic. Rajasinghe et al. present
such a framework called INSecS-DCS [86] which captures
network traffic at network devices or uses already captured
network traffic in pcap files as input. Then, INSecS-DCS
divides the data stream into time windows, extracts data points
with appropriate attributes, and labels the network traffic based
on a user-defined attacker IP address list. Consequently, the
focus of INSecS-DCS is on labeling network traffic and on
extracting meaningful attributes. Aparicio-Navarro et al. [87]
present an automatic data set labeling approach using an
unsupervised anomaly-based IDS. Since no IDS is able to
classify each data point to the correct class, the authors take
some middle ground to reduce the number of false positives
and true negatives. The IDS assigns belief values to each
data point for the classes normal and attack. If the difference
between the belief values for these two classes is smaller than
a predefined threshold, the data point is removed from the data
set. This approach increases the quality of the labels, but may
discard the most interesting data points of the data set.
VII. OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Labeled data sets are inevitable for training supervised data
mining methods like classification algorithms and helpful for
the evaluation of supervised as well as unsupervised data
mining methods. Consequently, labeled network-based data
sets can be used to compare the quality of different NIDS
with each other. In any case, however, the data sets must be
representative to be suitable for those tasks. The community is
aware of the importance of realistic network-based data, and
this survey shows that there are many sources for such data
(data sets, data repositories, and traffic generators). Further-
more, this work establishes a collection of data set properties
as a basis for comparing available data sets and for identifying
suitable data sets, given specific evaluation scenarios.
In the following, we discuss some aspects concerning the
use of available data sets and the creation of new data sets.
Perfect data set: The ever-increasing number of attack
scenarios, accompanied by new and more complex software
and network structures, leads to the requirement that data sets
should contain up-to-date and real network traffic. Since there
is no perfect IDS, labeling of data points should be checked
manually rather than being done exclusively by an IDS.
Consequently, the perfect network-based data set is up-to-date,
correctly labeled, publicly available, contains real network
traffic with all kinds of attacks and normal user behavior
as well as payload, and spans a long time. Such a data set,
however, does not exist and will (probably) never be created.
If privacy concerns could be satisfied and real-world network
traffic (in packet-based format) with all kind of attacks could
be recorded over a sufficiently long time, accurate labeling of
such traffic would be very time-consuming. As a consequence,
the labeling process would take so much time that the data
set is slightly outdated since new attack scenarios appear
continuously. However, several available data sets satisfy some
properties of a perfect data set. Besides, most applications do
not require a perfect data set - a data set which satisfies certain
properties is often sufficient. For instance, there is no need
that a data set contains all types of attacks when evaluating
a new port scan detection algorithm, or there is no need for
complete network configuration when evaluating the security
of a specific server. Therefore, we hope that this work supports
researchers to find the appropriate data set for their specific
evaluation scenario.
Use of several data sets: As mentioned above, no perfect
network-based data set exists. However, this survey shows that
there are several data sets (and other data sources) available
for packet- and flow-based network traffic. Therefore, we
recommend users to evaluate their intrusion detection methods
with more than one data set in order to avoid over-fitting to a
certain data set, reduce the influence of artificial artifacts of a
certain data set, and evaluate their methods in a more general
context. In addition to that, Hofstede et al. [88] show that
flow-based network traffic differs between lab environments
and production networks. Therefore, another approach could
be to use both, emulated respectively synthetic data sets and
real world network traffic to emphasize these points.
In order to ensure reproducibility for third parties, we
recommend evaluating intrusion detection methods with at
least one publicly available data set.
Further, we would like to give a general recommendation
for the use of the CICIDS 2017, CIDDS-001, UGR’16 and
UNSW-NB15 data sets. These data sets may be suitable for
general evaluation settings. CICIDS 2017 and UNSW-NB15
contain a wide range of attack scenarios. CIDDS-001 contains
detailed metadata for deeper investigations. UGR’16 stands
out by the huge amount of flows. However, it should be
considered that this recommendation reflects our personal
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views. The recommendation does not imply that other data
sets are inappropriate. For instance, we only refrain to include
the more widespread CTU-13 and ISCX 2012 data sets in our
recommendation due to their increasing age. Further, other
data sets like AWID or Botnet are better suited for certain
evaluation scenarios.
Predefined Subsets: Furthermore, we want to make a note
on the evaluation of anomaly-based NIDS. Machine learning
and data mining methods often use so-called 10-fold cross-
validation [89]. This method divides the data set into ten equal-
sized subsets. One subset is used for testing and the other nine
subsets are used for training. This procedure is repeated ten
times, such that every subset has been used once for testing.
However, this straight-forward splitting of data sets makes only
limited sense for intrusion detection. For instance, the port
scan data set CIDDS-002 [27] contains two weeks of network
traffic in flow-based format. Each port scan within this data set
may cause thousands of flows. Using 10-fold cross-validation
would lead to the situation that probably some flows of each
attack appear in the training data set. Thus, attack detection
in test data is facilitated and generalization is not properly
evaluated.
In that scenario, it would be better to train on week1 and test
on week2 (and vice versa) for the CIDDS-002 data set. Defin-
ing subsets on that approach may also consider the impact of
concept drift in network traffic over time. Another approach
for creating suitable subsets might be to split the whole data
set based on traffic characteristics like source IP addresses.
However, such subsets must be well designed to preserve the
basic network structures of the data set. For instance, a training
data set with exclusively source IP addresses which represent
clients and no severs would be inappropriate.
Based on these observations, we recommend creating mean-
ingful training and test splits with respect to the application
domain IT security. Therefore, benchmark data sets should
be published with predefined splits for training and test to
facilitate comparisons of different approaches evaluated on the
same data.
Closer collaboration: This study shows (see Section V)
that many data sets have been published in the last few years
and the community works on creating new intrusion detection
data sets continuously. Further, the community could benefit
from closer collaboration and a single generally accepted
platform for sharing intrusion detection data sets without any
access restrictions. For instance, Cermak et al. [90] work on
establishing such a platform for sharing intrusion detection
data sets. Likewise, Ring et al. [21] published their scripts
for emulating normal user behavior and attacks such that they
can be used and improved by third parties. A short summary
of all mentioned data sets and data repositories can be found
at our website 58 and we intend to update this website with
upcoming network-based data sets.
Standard formats: Most network-based intrusion detec-
tion approaches require standard input data formats and cannot
handle preprocessed data. Further, it is questionable if data sets
from category other (Section III-C) can be calculated in real
58http://www.dmir.uni-wuerzburg.de/datasets/nids-ds
time which may affect their usefulness in NIDS. Therefore,
we suggest providing network-based data sets in standard
packet-based or flow-based formats as they are captured in real
network environments. Simultaneously, many anomaly-based
approaches (e.g., [91] or [92]) achieve high detection rates in
data sets from the category other which is an indicator that
the calculated attributes are promising for intrusion detection.
Therefore, we recommend publishing both, the network-based
data sets in a standard format and the scripts for transforming
the data sets to other formats. Such an approach would have
two advantages. First, users may decide if they want to transfer
data sets to other formats and a larger number of researchers
could use the corresponding data sets. Second, the scripts
could also be applied to future data sets.
Anonymization: Anonymization is another important is-
sue since this may complicate the analysis of network-based
data sets. Therefore, it should be carefully evaluated which
attributes have to be discarded and which attributes may be
published in anonymous form. Various authors demonstrate
the effectiveness of using only small parts of payload. For ex-
ample, Mahoney [93] proposes an intrusion detection method
which uses the first 48 bytes of each packet starting with the
IP header. The flow exporter YAF [94] allows the creation
of such attributes by extracting the first n bytes of payload
or by calculating the entropy of the payload. Generally, there
are several methods for anonymization. For example, Xu et
al. [95] propose a prefix-preserving IP address anonymization
technique. Tcpmkpub [96] is an anonymization tool for packet-
based network traffic which allows the anonymization of some
attributes like IP addresses and also computes new values
for header checksums. We refer to Kelly et al. [97] for a
more comprehensive review of anonymization techniques for
network-based data.
Publication: We recommend the publication of network-
based data sets. Only publicly available data sets can be used
by third parties and thus serve as a basis for evaluating NIDS.
Likewise, the quality of data sets can only be checked by third
parties if they are publicly available. Last but not least, we
recommend the publication of additional metadata such that
third parties are able to analyze the data and their results in
more detail.
VIII. SUMMARY
Labeled network-based data sets are necessary for training
and evaluating NIDS. This paper provides a literature survey of
available network-based intrusion detection data sets. To this
end, standard network-based data formats are analyzed in more
detail. Further, 15 properties are identified that may be used to
assess the suitability of data sets. These properties are grouped
into five categories: General Information, Nature of the Data,
Data Volume, Recording Environment and Evaluation.
The paper’s main contribution is a comprehensive overview
of 34 data sets which points out the peculiarities of each
data set. Thereby a particular focus was placed on attack
scenarios within the data sets and their interrelationships. In
addition, each data set assessed with respect to the properties
of the categorization scheme developed in the first step. This
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detailed investigation aims to support readers to identify data
sets for their purposes. The review of data sets shows that the
research community has noticed a lack of publicly available
network-based data sets and tries to overcome this shortage
by publishing a considerable number of data sets over the last
few years. Since several research groups are active in this area,
additional intrusion detection data sets and improvements can
be expected soon.
As further sources for network traffic, traffic generators and
data repositories are discussed in Section VI. Traffic generators
create synthetic network traffic and can be used to create
adapted network traffic for specific scenarios. Data repositories
are collections of different network traces on the internet.
Compared to the data sets in Section V, data repositories
often provide limited documentation, non-labeled data sets or
network traffic of specific scenarios (e.g., exclusively FTP
connections). However, these data sources should be taken
into account when searching for suitable data, especially for
specialized scenarios. Finally, we discussed some observations
and recommendations for the use and generation of network-
based intrusion detection data sets. We encourage users to
evaluate their methods on several data sets to avoid over-fitting
to a certain data set and to reduce the influence of artificial
artifacts of a certain data set. Further, we advocate data sets in
standard formats including predefined training and test subsets.
Overall, there probably won’t be a perfect data set, but there
are many very good data sets available and the community
could benefit from closer collaboration.
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